Abstract-Due to the growing dependencies of information network technology, networked control systems are undergoing a severe blow of cyberattacks, and simply modeling cyberattacks is inadequate and impractical for the detection requirements, because of various vulnerabilities in these systems and the diversities of cyberattacks. Actually, a feasible viewpoint is to identify misbehaviors by constructing a normal model of industrial communication behaviors. However, one of the chief difficulties is how to completely and appropriately summarize industrial communication behaviors according to the specific communication characteristics. In view of process control and data acquisition, this paper associates industrial communication characteristics with the time sequence, and further extracts two distinct behaviors: function control behavior and process data behavior. Based on these double behavior characteristics, we introduce one-class classification to detect the corresponding anomalies, respectively. Besides, we also present the weighted mixed Kernel function and parameter optimization method to improve classification performance. Experimental results clearly demonstrate that the proposed approach has significant advantages of classification accuracy and detection efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
N ETWORKED control systems are typically regarded as the automated management and control system of industrial infrastructures to perform various industrial activities, including industrial process control, data acquisition and monitoring, business process management et al., and they cover all kinds of automation control components and realtime data acquisition and monitoring components [1] . At this stage, networked control systems, such as SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) and DCS (Distributed Control Systems), have been widely applied in many critical infrastructures including power stations, water distribution, petrochemical plants, transportation systems, etc [2] . Actually, the original control systems were designed as the enclosed self-determination system, and the experienced engineers willingly focus on the process safety [3] . However, with the fast development of IT (Information Technology), such enclosed situations are gradually broken. Especially, in recent years Industrie 4.0 [4] and Industrial Internet [5] further emphasize the deep integration IT and OT (Operational Technology). Therefore, networked control systems are facing more and more cyberattacks due to the growing dependencies of the information network technology [6] - [8] , such as Stuxnet attack [9] and Ukrainian power grid attack [10] . According to the research reports of USA ICS-CERT (Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team), the number of industrial security incidents has reached 295 in 2015 [11] . Although many kinds of security technologies have been designed in the regular IT system, these technologies cannot be applied in networked control systems without any change due to the industrial-oriented communication protocols or the unique properties [12] , [13] . In fact, the main reasons for the vulnerabilities of networked control systems can be summarized in two aspects: from the perspective of their internal architectures, because the industrial-oriented communication protocols, real-time operating systems or embedded hardware/software platforms lack the applicable security mechanisms, the attackers can easily perform the destructive operations by exploiting the intrinsic system weaknesses [14] , [15] ; from the perspective of the external network environment, because the communication mechanism has developed into the IP-based communication pattern, the traditional IT threats can uncontrollably infiltrate into industrial control networks and cause significant damage [6] , [16] . As a result, both academia and industry are now developing security solutions serving specially in networked control systems, and these solutions generally relate to threat prevention [17] , [18] , vulnerability evaluation [19] , [20] and intrusion detection [13] , [21] . As a bypass approach to detect misbehaviors without disrupting the availability and real-time performance of networked control systems, intrusion detection has been attracting great interests of researchers. Especially, the existing control systems are naturally short of the ability to detect or report anomalous activities [13] . In recent years, anomaly detection approaches in networked control systems have been developed, and it is in principle capable to identify novel attacks by measuring a deviation from a learned normal behavior [22] . However, it is a formidable task to completely and appropriately learn industrial communication behaviors from the network traffic of control systems, because the communication characteristics in networked control systems are strongly correlated to various industrial activities, and it not only need analyze the interaction contents in depth according to industrial communication protocols, but also need associate these contents with the time sequence.
In particular, we overcome the above difficulties from two aspects: on the one hand, industrial communication behaviors consider industrial communication protocols as the carriers to accomplish the automatic operation and management, mainly including process control and data acquisition [2] . That is, completely modeling industrial communication behaviors must involve these two industrial activities; on the other hand, different with the traditional IT system, the networked control system has the relatively steady communication patterns [23] , namely the characteristics of periodicity and time-sequence can provide a helpful pattern to appropriately model industrial communication behaviors. Above all, by extracting two types of interaction contents from the communication packets and associating with the time sequence, we can summarize two industrial communication behaviors: function control behavior and process data behavior. Furthermore, the function control behavior presents the specific operation and control to achieve the system monitoring and configuring under different manufacturing processes, and the process data behavior presents the changing situation of process data under the continuous technical process.
Based on these two specific behaviors, we introduce one-class classification to accomplish anomaly detection in networked control systems. In particular, for the function control behavior, we use OCSVM (One Class Support Vector Machine) as the first one-class classifier to identify function control misbehaviors; for the process data behavior, we utilize RE-KPCA (Reconstruction Error based on Kernel Principal Component Analysis) to detect process data anomalies. Additionally, we also present the weighted mixed kernel function and PSO (Particle Swarm Algorithm) parameter optimization to improve classification performance. At last, we build a simulation control system based on Modbus/TCP to evaluate our approach, and the experimental results show that our behavior extraction algorithm can effectively reflect the feature changes of two industrial communication behaviors, and the optimized detection approach has significant advantages of classification accuracy and detection efficiency to identify these two misbehaviors.
The main advantages of our approach are listed as follows: for one thing, according to industrial communication characteristics, our approach innovatively proposes two behavior extraction algorithms to completely and appropriately model industrial communication behaviors, and these algorithms can provide a good description of industrial activities with the time sequence; for another, our approach present two applicable one-class classifiers to perform anomaly detection for these two industrial communication behaviors, and these classifiers are optimized to meet the needs of the corresponding behavior detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview on behavior anomaly detection in networked control systems. Section III describes the proposed two behavior extraction algorithms. Section IV outlines the one-class anomaly detection approach. Additionally, we also depict kernel function selection and parameter optimization in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Our experiments and discussions are presented in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII provides some concluding remarks regarding this research.
II. RELATED WORK
The main purpose of behavior anomaly detection approaches in networked control systems is to build a normal industrial communication behavior model, and identify misbehaviors by using this model to compare with the observed industrial communication data. According to the work in [24] , the behavior anomaly detection approaches can be classified into three main categories: statistical-based, knowledge-based and machine learning-based.
In the statistical-based cases, a network traffic profile representing stochastic industrial communication behaviors is created to detect anomalies. Wei and Kim [25] propose a data traffic prediction model based on autoregressive moving average (ARMA) using the series data to detect intrusion attacks in wireless industrial networks. Kwon et al. [26] present a behavior-based IDS for IEC 61850 protocol using both statistical analysis of traditional network features and specification-based metrics to secure smart grid network. Ponomarev and Atkison [27] give a network telemetry-based intrusion detection system to secure the communication of network attached ICSs, and network telemetry include temporal data of packet arrival, packet sizes, session times and sizes, amount of dropped packets and more. Although the statisticalbased approaches may identify some unknown attacks in some degree, the main drawbacks are that it is a difficult task to set the different metrics or parameters of traffic profile, and the deep industrial communication behaviors cannot be simply modeled by a statistical distribution.
In the knowledge-based cases, an expert system or a specification-based model which keeps a set of rules is constructed to determine legitimate industrial communication behaviors. Goldeberg and Wool [16] use a unique DFA (Deterministic Finite Automation) associated with each HMI-PLC channel to flag anomalies in Modbus/TCP networks. Carcano et al. [28] present an innovative approach based on the concept of critical state analysis and state proximity, and the possible critical states are well represented and documented to detect particular types of SCADA attacks based on chains of licit commands. Zhou et al. [29] construct multiple models by comprehensively analyzing the multidomain knowledge of field control layers in industrial process automation, and a classifier based on an intelligent hidden Markov model is designed to differentiate the actual attacks from faults. In practice, the knowledge-based approaches are characterized with good robustness and flexibility. However, the primary drawback is that it is very difficult and timeconsuming to develop the high-quality knowledges [24] .
In the machine learning-based cases, an explicit or implicit model needs to be trained with the labeled data to categorize the behavior patterns. Until now, there are many researches on the machine learning-based anomaly detection in networked control systems, mainly including: clustering technique [30] - [32] , neural network [33] , [34] , Bayes algorithm [21] , genetic algorithm [35] , fuzzy logic [36] , and support vector method [37] - [41] . Furthermore, these approaches have a good adaptability and flexibility, but there are still some insufficiencies in feature extraction of industrial communication behaviors and model parameter optimization. It's worth mentioning that the proposed approach in this paper belongs to the machine learning-based cases. In particular, this approach classifies industrial communication behaviors into function control behavior and process data behavior, and the corresponding feature and extraction algorithms of these two behaviors are presented in detail. Additionally, our approach focuses on one-class classification which has been growing in detecting faults and intrusions in networked control systems [39] , because one-class classification not only is suitable for the kind of traffic behavior and periodicity in networked control systems, but also do not require the specific attack samples of industrial communications, which are scarce and often not publicly disclosed by utility companies [41] .
III. BEHAVIOR EXTRACTION ALGORITHM
As defined in Section I, industrial communication behaviors mainly include function control behavior and process data behavior. Furthermore, the function control behavior can be described by a group of vectors which are composed of some function codes in the packets, and the process data behavior can be described by a series of vectors which consist of some address and value information in the packets.
A. Feature Selection and Extraction for Function Control Behavior
We first capture the industrial communication packets in the T 1 time interval, and extract the function code sequence A i = a 
Because of the different packet numbers in each t i time interval, the number of function codes in every function code sequence may vary, that is, when i = j , m i = m j . Therefore, the dimensions of all function code sequences are not the same. However, the prerequisite for the one-class classification algorithm is that all samples must have the same dimension number. So, in order to get the same dimension, the above n function code sequences need to be reconstructed to some new function samples by the feature selection and extraction. Of course, it can avoid this challenge if we only set the fixed length for all function code sequences. But this design has no consideration for the possible influence of the time factor, and lacks the randomness and flexibility of sample selection.
Based on our prior work [42] - [44] , this paper proposes an improving algorithm which can transform the different function code sequences under the specified time interval into the function samples with the same dimension. 
Namely, each function code sequence
can be changed to a new function sample
, where x i j represents the j th feature variable in the i th function sample, and k is the corresponding dimension number. Figure 1 depicts the detailed algorithm process, and each step can be summarized as follows:
Step 1: feature factor selection. In order to construct the function sample
with the same dimension, we first determine the feature factors, and then compute the feature variable x i j by using these feature factors. In this algorithm, the feature factors can be divided into two aspects: one is the frequency of some function code in the function code sequence, and the other is the probability of two neighboring function codes in the function code sequence. In particular, the first factor reflects its own value of each function code in the function code sequence, and the second factor describes the correlation between two neighboring function codes, which also shows the continuous operations in the industrial control process.
Step 2: dimension number calculation. Because the second factor includes two neighboring function codes, we assume that a short sequence pattern is composed of two consecutive function codes. By the sliding window whose length is 2, we analyze each function code sequence A i successively, and get up to 
is formed by the arrangement of two function codes.
Step 3: function sample extraction. For any function code
, we extract the corresponding function sample 
According to the above formula, we can calculate each feature variable in
, and obtain the final function sample set X = {x 1 ,
It is easy to see that the above algorithm has three advantages: first, the function code sequences of different lengths under the specified time interval can be mapped to the function samples with the same dimension, and these function samples facilitate the further processing; second, different with our prior work [42] - [44] , the function samples not only consider the information entropy of single function code in the function code sequence, but also reflect the frequency characteristic of two neighboring function codes. So, the function samples can describe the function code sequence rationally and effectively; third, our prior work used three consecutive function codes as a short sequence, and this design may cause a large dimension number of function samples. For example, if there are 4 different function codes in function code sequences, the dimension number can be 4 3 = 64. So, in order to reduce the dimension and computational complexity, the proposed algorithm in this paper selects two neighboring function codes as a short sequence pattern.
B. Feature Selection and Extraction for Process Data Behavior
For the feature selection and extraction of process data behavior, we cannot adopt the same algorithm with the function control behavior, because the process data behavior may own a large number of addresses and a broad range of values.
In this algorithm, we first capture the industrial communication packets in the T 2 time interval, and extract the addresses and values from the packets in each τ i time interval (T 2 = n i=1 τ i , and τ i = τ i+1 , ∀i ∈ [1, n − 1]). After that, we regroup the addresses and values to the process data sequence . Additionally, all process data sequences D i (i ∈ [1, n] ) comprise the data sample set
As with the function sample set, the dimensions of all process data sequences are also different, and the dimension number may be too large to directly carry out anomaly detection. So, we also need reduce the dimensions of n process data sequences to construct some new data samples by the feature selection and extraction.
In this paper, we introduce the clustering approach to obtain the data sample
with the same dimension. Furthermore, we first determine the initial cluster centers by the information entropy of each element in all process data sequences, and then use K-means algorithm [32] to reduce the dimension of each process data sequence D i . The detailed algorithm can be described below:
Step 1: for each process data sequence D i , we calculate the information entropy
Here, P j is the probability of d i j in D i , and its formula is P j = g(d i j ) m i . After that, we rearrange all information entropies in descending order, and select the first k corresponding elements as the initial cluster centers c i u (u ∈ [1, k] ). It is because that the bigger the information entropy is, the greater the amount of information is, and the larger the probability to become a cluster center is.
Step 2: according to k initial cluster centers, we calculate the corresponding cluster c ( j ) which each element d i j belongs to. The formula is the following:
Here, c ( j ) represents the nearest cluster to d i j in all k cluster centers, and
Step 3: for each cluster, we recalculate its cluster center by
Step 4: repeat Steps 1 and 2 until the change between two consecutive cluster centers is sufficiently small. The change can be computed by
Here, c i u,a represents the current center of the cluster u, and c i u,b represents the next center of the cluster u.
Step 5: above all, the final k cluster centers can be regarded as new features of the process data sequence D i . However, each cluster center c i u (u ∈ [1, k] ) is also a twodimensional vector which can be expressed as 
As depicted in Figure 2 , the above formula shows that the distance between the point (l i u , b i u ) and the fixed point (l, b) in the two-dimensional plane can be mapped to one point in the one-dimensional line.
According to the above formula, we can calculate each feature variable y i k in the data sample
, and obtain the final data sample set Y = {y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n }. Mapping of new features from two-dimensional plane to one-dimensional line.
IV. ANOMALY DETECTION BASED ON ONE-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
In accordance with function samples and data samples, we can establish a double one-class classification model. Furthermore, this model uses OCSVM as the first one-class classifier to build the normal mode of the function control behavior, and utilizes RE-KPCA as the second one-class classifier to build the normal mode of the process data behavior.
A. One Class Support Vector Machine
OCSVM is an improved algorithm developed on the basis of the traditional SVM, and can train a proper classifier by using only one kind of samples [45] . Furthermore, OCSVM supposes the coordinate origin as the abnormal sample, and constructs an optimal hyperplane to gain the maximum margin between the target samples and the coordinate origin in the high-dimensional feature space.
According to the work in [38] and [43] - [45] , it is generally known that OCSVM is mainly used to resolve the following quadratic programming problem:
Here, x i is the training sample, and x 1 , · · ·, x r ∈ X; r is the number of all training samples, and : X → H is the mapping from the raw space to the high dimensional feature space; ω and ρ are the normal vector and the compensation parameter of the hyperplane in H ; ν is a tradeoff parameter which can be adjusted from 0 to 1, and it can control the proportion of support vectors in the training samples; ξ i is the slack variable which expresses some training samples can be incorrectly classified.
By introducing Lagrange function to solve the quadratic programming problem, we can obtain the following decision function:
From the above formula we can see that, the parameter ν is a crucial factor to influence the performance of OCSVM. So, this parameter should be tuned for maximum performance benefit.
B. Reconstruction Error Based on Kernel Principal Component Analysis
KPCA is a nonlinear development of the traditional principal component analysis, and it processes better classification performance because of its fine effect on the feature extraction of nonlinear statistics and high-order statistics [46] , [47] . Furthermore, the main idea of KPCA is to change a nonlinear problem in the original space to a linear problem in the highdimensional feature space by means of the nonlinear function mapping. After that, it can carry out the linear principal component analysis in the high-dimensional space, and get the linear principal components which are also the nonlinear principal components in the original space.
Suppose that there are n data samples y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n in the original space, here y i ∈ R N . According to Mercer's theorem, there is a mapping : R N → R F which makes y i → (y i ). So, the basic goal of KPCA is to analyze the principal components of the mapped data set (y 1 
In accordance with the work in [39] and [48] , we can define the reconstruction error in the new feature space as
Here, z is a data sample. V represents a projection operation, and it is composed of s (s ≤ n) eigenvectors v (1) , v (2) , · · · v (s) , which correspond to the top s eigenvalues. In addition, ( (z) · (z)) is the squared distance between (z) and the center 0
. By calculating the reconstruction errors of the training data samples, we can get a reconstruction error threshold. For a new data sample, we first calculate its reconstruction error, and then compare this error with the reconstruction error threshold. If this error cannot conform to the demand of the reconstruction error threshold, this sample is considered as an outlier.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF KERNEL FUNCTION
The common characteristic of the above one-class classifiers is to carry out the data mapping from the initial space to the high dimensional feature space, and then uses the linear classification method to detect abnormal industrial communication behaviors. In order to reduce the computational complexity of non-linear transformation, we must introduce the kernel functions to transform the linearly non-separable problem in the initial space to the linearly separable problem in the high dimensional feature space. In fact, the kernel functions have the following property [49] :
When k 1 and k 2 are two kernel functions in X × X (X ⊆ R n ), k 1 + k 2 , ak 1 (∀a ≥ 0) and k 1 k 2 are also kernel functions.
According to the above property, we can construct a complex mixed kernel function by using several kernel functions, and it also satisfy Mercer's theorem. Because different kernel functions have distinct effects on the classifier's performance, it may have some limitations if we only use one single kernel function to solve a practical problem. Different with our prior work [43] , [44] , in this paper we construct a weighted mixed kernel function based on Gaussian kernel function and Polynomial kernel function. The weighted mixed kernel function can be depicted as
Here, we define p and q as the weight coefficients.
In the above mixed kernel function, Gaussian kernel function has a good learning ability, and is suited for solving small samples. Additionally, it also owns a wide convergence region and a strong interpolation ability, and is much better at extracting the local properties of the samples. Therefore, Gaussian kernel function is more applicable in OCSVM to detect the function control anomalies. Differently, Polynomial kernel function possesses excellent abilities of generalization and extendibility, and links with the similarity between data vectors. Although Polynomial kernel function owns relatively weak interpolation ability, it is adept in extracting the global properties of the samples. Therefore, Polynomial kernel function is more applicable in KPCA to detect the process data anomalies. In conclusion, the above mixed kernel function not only keeps the local performance of Gaussian kernel function, but also possesses the global performance of Polynomial kernel function. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that we can adjust p and q to change the weights of two kernel functions, and improve the classification performance.
VI. PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION In the above one-class classification algorithms, there are four ambiguous parameters, including the tradeoff parameter ν, the kernel parameter g, the weight coefficients p and q. Here, ν is an estimated percentage, and maintains close contacts with the number of support vectors. If ν is too large, it can cause the low classification accuracy. Conversely, if ν is too small, although it may improve the classification accuracy, it can increase the false alarm rate. In addition, the parameter g has a major impact on the hyperplane of OCSVM. When g is small, although there are more support vectors to increase the description accuracy and achieve the linear separability of training samples, it may easily result in the over-fitting problem and the poor generalization. When g is large, although it can enhance the generalization ability, it also reduces the description accuracy and the classification accuracy. As described in the previous section, the weight coefficients p and q can obviously balance the local and global performances of the whole kernel function. Different with the mixture method of kernels in [50] and [51] , in order to ensure their freedom and improve their adjustability, we do not impose other additional limitations, such as p + q = 1, and each value range of p and q is set to [0, 1] .
In this paper, we use the PSO [42] , [52] to optimize the above four parameters. PSO is a very simple swarm intelligent optimization algorithm, and has been widely applied in various models to get the optimal design parameters. In our approach, we carry out two parameter optimization: for OCSVM, we use PSO to optimize one group of parameters, including the tradeoff parameter ν, the kernel parameter g, the weight coefficients p and q; for RE-KPCA, we use PSO to optimize another group of parameters, including the kernel parameter g, the weight coefficients p and q.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Due to the lack of real-world industrial communication traces, we carry out some attack and detection experiments to evaluate our approach in the simulation control system based on Modbus/TCP, and the main functional components of this system are simulated by several computers. Although there is a gap between the simulation control system and typical ICS systems, our original aim is only to demonstrate the proposed approach is effective and feasible by detecting two industrial communication behaviors and our behavior extraction algorithms are appropriate. Additionally, in order to facilitate the evaluation, this simulation control system simplifies the realworld technological process, but we believe the corresponding control processes are without loss of generality. In the future work, we will try to get some real-world industrial communication traces to analyze the proposed approach in detail.
As shown in Figure 3 , this control system mainly includes three layers: the top layer is the supervisory control layer, which is composed of three operator workstations and one attacker; the middle layer is the control unit layer, which is composed of three PLCs and one industrial switch; the bottom layer is the virtual field layer, which is composed of three tanks with three valves and some liquid level sensors. The technological process can be outlined as follows: firstly, by opening the valves a and b, materials a and b flow into the middle tank to produce material c; secondly, when material c in the middle tank reaches the level upper point, it can be discharged by opening the valve c and closing the valves a and b; finally, when material c exhausts and reaches the level lower point, the valve c is closed. In the technological process, three operator stations successively send the Modbus/TCP control packets to three PLCs, and three PLCs respectively set and read the three valves and the liquid levels. Additionally, we repeat the technological process every 1 minute.
In order to analyze the normal communication behaviors of this system, we run this system and capture all packets from the monitor port of industrial switch. Furthermore, we use Libpcap mechanism to capture the packets, and parse all Modbus/TCP packets in depth by using our own Linux C program. In this program, we perform the packet analysis layer by layer to obtain function codes, addresses and values according to Modbus/TCP protocol specification [17] . In particular, the whole capture time is about one hour 40 minutes, and the number of captured Modbus/TCP packets is 46,485. Additionally, we use MATLAB to analyze the experimental data, and it runs on a PC with a 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 GB RAM. Figure 4 plots the number of each function code per 1 minute. From this figure we can see that, in the normal technological process there are four categories of function codes (1, 3, 5 and 6), and the number of each function code in 100 minutes fluctuates in a tight range. Therefore, it can indirectly reflect that the status of the system's function control is relatively finite and changeless. Similarly, Figure 5 shows the averages of address variables and value variables per 30 seconds, and it proves a general stability of the changes of the average address variables and the average value variables. Occasionally, several individual troughs appear in these two curves, the reason for this case mainly includes two aspects: network packet loss and PLC's response timeout. Similarly, we can also see this phenomenon from the curves of function codes 1 and 3 in Figure 4 . Additionally, we also plot the mapping result in Figure 5 by using the mentioned method in Section 3.2, and the fixed point is set to the origin (0, 0). From this curve, it is observed that it can fully reflect the variation pattern of the address variables and value variables. To sum up, the system runs steadily and orderly under normal conditions.
A. Detection Evaluation for Function Control Behavior
Before evaluating the detection performance of function control behavior, we first get the function code sequences from the Modbus/TCP packets per 1 minute, and extract the function samples according to the behavior extraction algorithm proposed in Section III. In the final function sample set, there are altogether 100 function samples, and each function sample has 16 features because of 4 different function codes. Based on this training function sample set, we build a normal mode of the function control behavior.
In order to build an optimal OCSVM model, we use the PSO algorithm to search for its best parameters. In this PSO optimization experiment, the number of particles is 20, and the number of iterations is 50. Additionally, we set the PSO's initial parameters c 1 = 1.5 and c 2 = 1.7, which respectively represents the local search ability and the global search ability. Specially, we regard the classification accuracy of OCSVM as the fitness function, and the fitness value is calculated by 3-fold cross validation way.
The fitness curves are plotted in Figure 6 when we apply the mixed kernel function (d = 2 in the part of Polynomial kernel function). From this figure we can conclude that, in the iterative optimization the best fitness value can quickly converge to the equilibrium value, and the best fitness value reach 97 in the 4th iteration. So, it can indirectly demonstrate PSO has the relatively high efficiency in the parameter-optimized process. Besides, the average fitness value changes significantly over the number of iterations, and it also indicates PSO has a powerful ability of global search. In order to compare the mixed kernel function with Gaussian kernel function and Polynomial kernel function, we give different fitness curves when separately using these three kernel functions to search the optimal parameters. As shown in Figure 7 , when we apply Polynomial kernel function in OCSVM, the best fitness value is just 94, and it is less than the one under the mixed kernel function, namely the mixed kernel function is superior to Polynomial kernel function. In addition, although there are the same best fitness values when we using the mixed kernel function and Gaussian kernel function, the convergence speed of Gaussian kernel function is obviously slower. However, it also has its own weakness when using the mixed kernel function. That is, its consuming time is about 29.39s, which is much more than the ones when using Gaussian kernel function and Polynomial kernel function.
Above all, we can get the optimal parameters of OCSVM: ν = 0.0817, g = 13.5753, p = 1 and q = 0.9884. With these parameters and the training sample set, we can build an optimal OCSVM model to discriminate between normal function control behaviors and abnormal function control behaviors. Furthermore, we test the 100 training function samples to calculate the classification accuracy by using this model. Figure 8 depicts the predicted result of this function sample set. In this figure, the categories include two parts: 1± and −1±. Here, 1± represents the normal function control behavior, and −1± represents the abnormal function control behavior. As shown in this figure, Figure 8 (a) and Figure 8(b) gives the actual categories and the predicted categories of all these 100 function samples, respectively. According to the predicted result, we can see that the classification accuracy reaches 97%, and only three function samples are mistakenly regarded as the outliers. Additionally, the consuming time of this detection is only about 0.036s, namely we just take less than 1 second to detect the function samples in 100 minutes. Therefore, through this training test and the above-mentioned PSO parameter optimization, it verifies that our approach not only has the strong learning ability, but also possesses the characteristic of fine generalization. In order to further evaluate the trained model, we simulate to send lots of malicious function control commands to the PLCs, and destroy the normal technological process. To be specific, these malicious commands consist of two parts: the regular four function codes with aberrant sending frequency and the inactive function codes distinguished with the regular function codes. After the behavior extraction described in Section III, we generate a total of 1000 test function samples, in which there are 720 normal function samples and 280 abnormal function samples. Additionally, we perform 12 experiments to evaluate the model's performance on the predicted accuracy and consuming time, and Table I illustrates the experimental results in detail. From this table we can see that the average predicted accuracy and average consuming time are 91.37% and 0.457s, respectively. Especially, the maximum predicted accuracy can reach 93.4% in the 12th experiment, and the minimum consuming time is only 0.401s in the 5th experiment. In conclusion, for the above anomalies, these results indicate that our approach has distinct advantages of classification accuracy and detection efficiency. To some degrees, it also indirectly explains the feature selection and extraction algorithm for the function control behavior can reflects the characteristics of process control in industrial communications.
In addition, we also give the accuracy comparison under different kernel functions in Table II , and each average predicted accuracy is computed by 12 experimental results. From this table we can see that the average predicted accuracies under Gaussian kernel function and Polynomial kernel function are 87.11% and 57.55% respectively, and both of them are lower than the one of our model. In other words, these results indirectly demonstrate that the proposed mixed kernel function can have the capacity to improve the predicted accuracy.
B. Detection Evaluation for Process Data Behavior
As with the detection evaluation for function control behavior, we first calculate the data samples according to the obtained address variables and value variables from the Modbus/TCP packets. Differently, due to too many address variables and value variables, we extract these data samples per 30 seconds. Therefore, a total of 200 data samples are stored in the final data sample set. Additionally, in the algorithm proposed in Section III we set the number of initial cluster centers is 10, that is, there are 10 features in each data sample. Because RE-KPCA needs a great number of computing resources, we eliminate the unnecessary duplication from these data samples, and finally obtain 28 distinctive data samples to form the training data sample set.
So as to compute the optimal reconstruction error threshold, we also use the PSO algorithm to search for the excellent parameters. Additionally, in this experiment we set the same parameters with the ones in the OCSVM optimization experiment, such as the number of particles, the number of iterations and the initial PSO parameters c 1 and c 2 . However, the difference is that we simulate three types of attacks to calculate the fitness value, and each type has 20 test attack data samples. More specifically, we name the first one the minor attack, which uses some small abnormal addresses or values to damage the technological process. The second one is called the medium attack, which uses some moderate abnormal addresses or values to damage the technological process. The last one is regarded as the major attack, which uses some large abnormal addresses or values to damage the technological process. In particular, we define the corresponding fitness function as
( Number of predicted attacks Number of each type of test attacks ), In practice, as the one-class classification approach, RE-KPCA should be trained by using all normal data samples. However, in this evaluation we accomplish the PSO parameter optimization by three types of attack data samples, and the reasons are chiefly as follows: on the one hand, different with other sophisticated attacks, our simulated attack data samples, which are only formed by abnormal addresses and values, are very simple and easy to work out. Furthermore, any address or value deviated from the normal level can be regarded as one attack to be used to calculate the fitness value, and if the normal data samples are determined, the corresponding abnormal data samples can be easily obtained; on the other hand, another important objective is to conveniently evaluate the different classification accuracies for three types of attacks, because the optimal reconstruction error threshold can be calculated by using the attack data samples.
Similarly, we also use the mixed kernel function in this experiment, and the parameter d of Polynomial kernel function is 2. Additionally, the whole run time of this PSO parameter optimization is 19h28m51s. Figure 9 shows the best and average fitness curves with the number of iterations. Because of the high performance of PSO algorithm, the best fitness value converges to the steady value 93.33% after the 7th iteration, namely the highest classification accuracy for all test attack samples. In fact, for each type of test attack samples, the best fitness values reach 90%, 90% and 100%, respectively. In addition, the average fitness value also reaches the steady value in the 14th iteration, and it illustrates that all PSO particles have achieved the optimal state. Finally, we obtain the best parameters g = 0.001, p = 1 and q = 0.0001. By using these parameters, we can further calculate the reconstruction error threshold [0.0738, 2.2581].
In order to evaluate the practical detection performance, we perform 12 experiments for each type of attack to analyze the predicted accuracy and consuming time. In each experiment, we generate 24 attack data samples for each type of attack according to the behavior extraction described in Section III. Additionally, we calculate the reconstruction errors of all attack data samples to detect the abnormal communication behaviors, and the judgment rules are the following: if the reconstruction error of some data sample conforms to the above reconstruction error threshold, the corresponding sample is classified as a normal communication behavior; otherwise not. Figure 10 depicts the predicted accuracies of three different attack types under 12 experiments. From this figure we can see that the predicted accuracy of minor attack is the lowest and the one of major attack is the highest. Moreover, the predicted accuracy for minor attack has the biggest fluctuation, and the range between the lowest and highest predicted accuracies reaches 33.34%. The main reason is that the minor attack only causes a small change on the addresses and values, and the corresponding reconstruction error is difficult to escape from the reconstruction error threshold. Therefore, the predicted accuracy for minor attack is relatively low and unstable. Table III gives the average predicted accuracy and average consuming time under different attack types. More exactly, the average predicted accuracy for all three attack types is about 83.45%, and although this result is less than the one to detect the function control behaviors, it is still acceptable because of the detection complexity. In particular, the consuming time for each attack type is approximately identical, and the average consuming time for all three attack types is about 26.11s. That is to say, for each attack data sample whose time interval is 30s, the consuming time to calculate and compare the reconstruction error is little more than 1 second. In extreme situations, in order to improve the classification accuracy, we can train a separate group of best parameters for each attack type, and the best fitness value for each attack type can reach 100% by our further experiments. However, such design way may be considered unsuitable by us, and the main reasons are as follows: for one thing, each group of parameters need a detection engine to calculate the reconstruction error, and too many engines must waste the system's computing and storage resources; for another, in this paper we only list three types of attacks according to our experimental environment.
In fact, if we define the attacks through more specific classification, there may be many more than three types of attacks. Therefore, for each type of attacks, one new data sample will be reused to calculate the corresponding reconstruction error, and this may reduce the detection efficiency because of a huge waste of time.
C. Performance Comparison
Based on the above two industrial communication behaviors, we use different anomaly detection approaches to compare the detection performance, and give the reasons for the adopted one-class classification approach in this paper. In these experiments, the other detection approaches include BP neural network and NB (Naive Bayes) classification algorithm, and the related items include TA (Training Accuracy) and PA (Predicted Accuracy). Table IV depicts the comparison results of different anomaly detection approaches for two industrial communication behaviors. From this table we can see that, even though the training accuracies of OCSVM and RE-KPCA is slightly smaller than the ones of BP and DT, the corresponding predicted accuracies are well above the ones of BP and DT. In particular, by using these four anomaly detection approaches, we find that the abnormal function control behavior is easier and more accurate to be identified than the abnormal process data behavior. Two causes are related to this situation: one is that the behavior extraction algorithm for function control behavior can reflect the function variation more precisely and generality; the other is that the types of different function codes in the same packets are far less than the variation ranges of addresses or values. In conclusion, the proposed one-class classification approach in this paper is more specifically suited for detecting anomalies of function control behaviors and process data behaviors.
D. Discussions
1) Classification Accuracy: in our approach, the major influences on the classification accuracy include two aspects: the behavior extraction algorithm and the double one-class classifiers. Furthermore, we apply two well-understood classification methods (OCSVM and RE-KPCA) to detect the abnormal behaviors in networked control systems, and the corresponding classification accuracies of these two methods have been researched in depth by both academia and industry [37] - [41] , [48] . Additionally, in the experiments we also propose the weighted mixed kernel function and the PSO optimization algorithm to improve the performances of these two methods. Therefore, in this subsection we only focus our discussion on the reduced accuracy possibly caused by the behavior extraction algorithm.
For the feature selection and extraction of function control behavior, in our algorithm we choose two consecutive function codes as a short sequence pattern, and the number of features is equal to the number of all short sequence patterns. Nevertheless, this design may affect the classification accuracy because the more function codes a short sequence pattern has, the more accurate descriptions the function control behaviors get. However, if a short sequence pattern includes too many function codes, the corresponding number of features will grow exponentially, and the anomaly detection need overcome the extremely high computational complexity. For example, in our experiments if a short sequence pattern is composed of three consecutive function codes, the number of features is 4 3 = 64. Therefore, although the short sequence pattern including two consecutive function codes may affect the classification accuracy, it can also save the computational time and improve the detection efficiency.
For the feature selection and extraction of process data behavior, on the one hand, the number of cluster centers may impact on the classification accuracy, because the large number of cluster centers can provide more information of process data behaviors for the anomaly detection, but it also bring us the problems of calculation efficiency. On the other hand, the proposed mapping method may also reduce the classification accuracy. In our mapping method, we use the distance from one point (l i u , b i u ) to the fixed point (l, b) as the feature variable y i k . However, as shown in Figure 11 , in the two-dimensional plane there might be another abnormal point (l i u , b i u ) whose distance to the fixed point (l, b) is equal to y i k . So, this abnormal point cannot cause the change of data samples, and the anomaly detection may miss this malicious process data behavior. Additionally, if one abnormal point only causes a very small change of data samples, the corresponding malicious behavior may be passed because its reconstruction error cannot beyond the error threshold.
2) Possibility of Anomaly Detection Together: according to double behavior characteristics, we propose two different one-class classification algorithms to detect abnormal communication behaviors, respectively. In order to ensure detection effectiveness, we cannot simply use one detection approach to give a simultaneous diagnosis for distinct industrial communication behaviors. Actually, it attributes to two reasons: one is the specificity of industrial communication protocols; the other is the applicability of various one-class classification algorithms.
In most industrial communication protocols, one function code can carry one or more addresses and values in one packet. For example, in Modbus/TCP protocol, the function code 16 is to write multiple registers, and the largest number of the followed registers to be written is 120. Therefore the number of addresses and values is much larger than the number of function codes in the same time interval. Additionally, for general industrial control protocols, the types of different function codes are far less than the variation ranges of addresses or values. For example, in Modbus/TCP protocol, the number of the public function codes is only 13, but the value written to one register can range from 0 to 2 16 . In most one-class classifications, OCSVM owns higher classification accuracy and smaller time complexity, and it can train more accurate model by using a small number of training samples. Therefore, OCSVM is more specifically suited for detecting the abnormal function control behavior. Differently, RE-KPCA is good at analyzing the non-linear data, and can provide more information about the data. So, RE-KPCA can map the data sample which also is a sort of non-linear data into the high-dimensional feature space, and extract the greatest data variation. By computing the diversity of data distribution in the high-dimensional feature space, RE-KPCA can utilize the reconstruction error to detect the aberrant process data behavior.
Although it seems as if we design two distinct algorithms to check the same industrial communication data, these algorithms can be used together to work in real-time. Additionally, it is also possible to correlate them together, but we need to consider the following preconditions: firstly, the captured industrial communication data should be appropriate. That is, the period of time to extract the sample is similar in each case, and the consuming time to detect each industrial communication behavior is almost equal; secondly, we need readjust the optimal parameters to achieve the best classification accuracy for both OCSVM and RE-KPCA.
3) Feasibility of Actual Application: it will be very convincing and compelling if we explore a evaluation in actual ICS systems. However, in this paper we only carry out some attack and detection experiments in the simulation control system due to the lack of the real data sets. Without loss of generality, our approach is feasible in practical application, and the reasons are chiefly as follows: firstly, from the experimental analysis, we can conclude that modeling two industrial communication behaviors is effective, and the behavior extraction algorithms have the great practicability because of the low computational complexity; secondly, the one-class classification algorithms, including OCSVM and RE-KPCA in this paper, are typically and widely used to detect various abnormal behaviors, and they can offer a relatively efficient and real-time capability to analyze the actual operating data; thirdly, in general the communication rate in real-world control systems is low and the amount of the online analyzed data is not large. Moreover, only in the training phase we need a large number of offline samples to build the accurate classifiers, and in the online detection phase our approach can provide an real-time alarm because it takes less consuming time to identify each sample. Additionally, we can also simplify the detection complexity by adjusting the time interval or the number of cluster centers in the behavior extraction algorithm.
From the above experimental results and analysis we can summarize that, compared with other detection approaches (such as BP neural network and NB classification algorithm), our approach has a more obvious advantage of classification accuracy. Furthermore, the predicted accuracy by using OCSVM to detect the abnormal function control behaviors is higher than the one by using RE-KPCA to detect the abnormal process data behavior, and the consuming time is just the opposite, but it still provide a fair real-time detection for networked control systems. In addition, we also give some discussions about the influences on the classification accuracy, the possibility of anomaly detection together and the feasibility of the actual application, and our main purpose is to make our approach more practicable and effective.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an one-class classification anomaly detection approach based on double behavior characteristics in networked control systems, and the main idea behind this design is easily understandable. That is, according to the specific industrial communication characteristics, identifying and diagnosing two industrial communication behaviors by establishing double one-class classifiers. We target the known difficulty to completely and appropriately summarize industrial communication behaviors, and introduce one-class classifiers (OCSVM and RE-KPCA) to identify the corresponding misbehaviors. Also, we use the weighted mixed kernel function and PSO parameter optimization to improve classification performance. By the experimental analysis we show that our approach has obvious advantages of classification accuracy and detection efficiency. Due to its advantages, we believe the proposed approach is feasible and promising.
